Abstract: In camera identification using sensor noise, the camera that took a given image can be determined with high certainty by establishing the presence of the camera's sensor fingerprint in the image. In this paper, we develop methods to reveal counter-forensic activities in which an attacker estimates the camera fingerprint from a set of images and pastes it onto an image from a different camera with the intent to introduce a false alarm and, in doing so, frame an innocent victim. We start by classifying different scenarios based on the sophistication of the attacker's activity and the means available to her and to the defender. The key observation is that at least some of the images that were used by the attacker to estimate the fake fingerprint will likely be available to the victim as well. We describe the so-called "triangle test" using which the victim can reveal attacker's malicious activity with high certainty under a wide range of conditions. We demonstrate the test's performance experimentally and investigate its limitations. The conclusion that can be made from this study is that planting a sensor fingerprint in an image without leaving a trace is significantly more difficult than previously thought.

  url          = {http://www.ws.binghamton.edu/fridrich/Research/EI7541-29.pdf},
  booktitle    = {SPIE Conference on Media Forensics and Security},
  author       = {Miroslav Goljan and Jessica Fridrich and Mo Chen},
  location     = {San Jose, CA},
  year         = {2010},
  title        = {Sensor noise camera identification: countering counter-forensics},